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University of Wisconsin-Madison In his Afterword to The Control of the Imaginary Jochen Schulte-Sasse elaborates a critique of mimesis that apparently goes against the very heart of Luiz Costa Lima's argumentation. For Schulte-Sasse artistic imagination in modernity "can no longer be perceived as mimetic in the sense of an artistic appropriation of reality" (220). Art as revelation is fully dependent upon the existence of a transcendent anchor for human life. The postEnlightenment practice of art, founded as it is on expressiveness, has a negative function insofar as it resists "the atrophy of thinking by the conditioning force of instrumental reason" (220). Mimesis can only work in favor of the legitimation of social power: "If modern art is indeed institutionalized in such a way that our commerce with it is compensatory in nature, then any effect a socially relevant, i. e., mimetic content might have will a priori be defused by its mode of institutionalization" (219). In my opinion, however, Costa Lima's elaboration of the notion of mimesis allows for a different interpretation of this problematic.
In Mimesis e modernidade (1980) Costa Lima offers a definition of mimesis that can function as the framework for his intellectual enterprise: "Mimesis, presupposing a similarity with the real understood as the possible, is a means for the self-recognition of the community, that is, an instrument of social identity" (21) . 1 The link between mimesis and community will give us a privileged point of entry into The Control of the Imaginary.
The book itself, as I see it, responds to endemic problems in Latin American critical circles regarding the political function of art, and in particular the contribution of literature to the constitution of social identity. By studying mimesis, Costa Lima does not want Latin American literature to fall into the trap of devoting itself, and therefore limiting itself, to the hopeless task of reproducing moralizing recipes for social and political redemption under the pretext of a recourse to the real, understood as the reality of oppression. On the other hand, and precisely by studying mimesis, Costa Lima wants to free literature, from a theoretical perspective, into the full scope of its intrinsic possibilities, up to and including a fundamental resistance to the understanding of its capacity as merely compensatory in nature. Mimesis, in the sense in which Costa Lima understands the term, does not primarily bespeak an appropriation of reality in the work of art, but an entrance into, and a dwelling in, the order of the real. 2 1 Under these determinations it is hard to see how Schulte-Sasse could have taken it for granted that a defense of "the mimetic nature of art" was equivalent to a defense of the "artistic appropriation of reality" in the subjectivistic, agential sense. Rather, following the logic of Costa Lima's admittedly abrupt articulations, we could say that mimesis is for him a displacement into the other, in which the other, which only appears in the form of a wound, forces a response which, far from being an attempt at appropriation, is first of all a pure staging of desire: the pure form of staging.4 This is not to say that Costa Lima's theory of mimesis runs counter to that of Aristotle. It does not run counter to it, but it is not identical with it either: "Obviously," he says in the preface to the English edition, "there can be no way to recuperate ... and restore the Greek sense of mimesis, for the very mentality of modern times, and within it the way that physis is conceived, has dramatically changed" (viii) . But there is a crucial aspect of the Aristotelian notion of mimesis which, although repressed and forgotten in the traditional understanding of mimesis as imitatio, is precisely what is recuperated in Costa Lima's notion of mimesis as a staging: "Aristotelian mimesis presupposed a concept of physic (to simplify, let us say of "nature") that contained two aspects: natura naturata and natura naturans, respectively, the actual and the potential. Mimesis had relation only to the possible, the capable of being created-to energeia; its limits were those of conceivability alone" (22). However, the field of conceivability, which sets the stage for the deployment of mimesis, does not coincide with the field of desire. Conceivability here is desire mediated by the possibility of expression, the possibility of construction of a socially articulable mimema. As Costa Lima's intention is to speak about mimesis as articulated in the literary artwork, he calls "the fictional" the artistic product of mimesis. The fictional is for Costa Lima the artistic mimema.
Before going on to discuss the fictional and several related notions, I would like to comment briefly on Benjamin's essay on the mimetic function. Although Costa Lima does not refer to it explicitly, there are grounds to argue that it is a major text in the genesis of Costa Lima's version of the concept. In any event, it will give me the chance to point out several crucial implications of The Control of the Imaginary.
The human capacity to see resemblances, Benjamin says, "is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else" (333). This old compulsion, which we have already seen invoked in Costa Lima's notion of mimesis as staging, is undergoing, according to Benjamin, a historical change: "The direction of this change seems definable as the increasing decay of the mimetic faculty" (334). This decay, in Benjamin's idiolect, does not testify to an absolute waning, but rather to a transformation, much like what happens to his notion of artistic "aura" in the age of mechanical rcproduction.5 The transformation of the mimetic faculty follows the lines of a progressive abandonment of cosmology as an "ethical" discipline. "Nevertheless we, too, possess a canon according to which the meaning of nonsensuous similarity can be at least partly clarified. And this canon is language" (334).
Benjamin's notion of nonsensuous similarity, developed from the idea that "the whole of language is onomatopoeic" (335), has been misunderstood, but most of all disregarded in the context of an appreciation of mimesis. I will argue that it is of extraordinary importance: it gives us the possibility to lay the radical claim that mimesis "under conditions of modernity" is still a means to enter the order of the real. Benjamin does not claim that nonsensuous similarity is a referential function in the conven-4
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1993] , Art. 10 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss1/10 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1316 tional sense. On the contrary, its meaning is circumscribed, as it can be understood as merely the material field of mediation "between the spoken and the signified but also between the written and the signified, and equally between the spoken and the written" (335). Benjamin's strongest thought comes in this:
The mimetic element in language can, like a flame, manifest itself only through a kind of bearer. This bearer is the semiotic element. Thus the coherence of words or sentences is the bearer through which, like a flash, similarity appears. For its production by man-like its perception by him-is in many cases, and particularly the most important, limited to flashes. It flits past. It is not improbable that the rapidity of writing and reading heightens the fusion of the semiotic and the mimetic in the sphere of language. (336) It follows that mimesis does not seek an appropriation of reality, but that it forms the conditions under which the real-in a flash-can come into the mimetic exchange. Schulte-Sasse maintains that one of the premises of the mimetic notion of art is "the effacement of the materiality and arbitrariness of language" (224). He is clearly operating under the notion of mimesis as imitatio. In Benjamin's, and Costa Lima's, understanding, the materiality of language becomes crucial to mimesis, for it is there that the possibility of nonsensuous similarity resides. Nonphenomenal materiality, to use an expression coined by the late Paul de Man, is the key to the mimema's, or, if you will, the fictional's presencing of the real . 6 Costa Lima follows Jean -Paul Sartre in considering the imaginary "one of the two forms of thematization of the world" (the other one being the perceptual) (ix) . "Between mimesis and fictional precipitation," that is, between mimesis and the mimema,"lies the imaginary" (ix). The imaginary, in concordance with the mimetic faculty's desire to be always somewhere else, thematizes things as absent. This is what Costa Lima names "the negation of the imaginary," in a subjective sense: it is the imaginary that negates. But it is precisely because this negation by the imaginary concretizes into the mimema, "because the fictional concretizes in a text that materializes in a signifying organization," that the fictional can be considered a negation of the imaginary's negation: the materiality of the fictional is radically upheld, and it is indeed only thanks to it that the fictional can be considered "a critical use of the imaginary" (ix) .
In what sense is it critical? This question introduces the last aspect of Costa Lima's work that I want to comment upon before concluding this review wi th some critical remarks. Because the fictional is a critical affirmation of the imaginary, it is not primarily concerned with issues of truth. Or rather: its aletheological import is not one that goes through the choice between truth and falsehood. As a critical affirmation of the imaginary, and thus as a material opening into absence, the fictional interrogates or even solicits every truth. Costa Lima says that it "takes the appearance of a 'game' that 5 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1993] , Art. 10 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss1/10 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1316 community ultimately depend upon the most obvious of all imitations, the imitation of authority. By invoking socialization as the limit of fictionality, Costa Lima unexpectedly reintroduces mimesis as imaatio: the fictional, at the end of Costa Lima's theory, must still be proper, in the sense of conforming to social expectations. But the proper, even within rapidly changing or even revolutionary societies, will not be dissociated from property, now understood not only as the control of the means of production, but also as the control of the very site of social territoriality: the site of ethics.
Vince Gugino has recently demonstrated that this problem, which I take to be fundamental not only for Costa Lima's work, but also in terms of its importance for any attempts at a postmetaphysical literary and political thinking, is quite intractable within the frame of a theory of mimesis.
After showing the probable etymological origin of mimesis in a constellation of terms meaning "change, exchange and substitution," Gugino remarks:
As exchange and the entire ensemble of the associations of exchange (imitation, copy, representation, etc.), mimesis is not itself exchanged.
Mimesis does not enter into the transaction, but walks off unaltered. This not -being -affected is the source of Plato's horror of mimesis and of his acceptance of its power. The power of mimesis is the possibility of exchange without reciprocity, an exchange which is instead unilateral, appropriative and ruling. (126) It is mimesis which defines property, not the mimetizing object or the mimetized agent, since "adcquation and assimilation of that which has been made like occurs as an appropriation of the differences of the material or being entering into the mimetic exchange" (128 
